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Abstract This article examines the question of how to assess our overall freedom in
terms of its so-called specific value, i.e., the part of its value that can be reduced to the
value of the various specific things we are free to do or be. It is argued that existing pref-
erence-based freedom rankings may fail to capture this value adequately and, drawing
on earlier work by Puppe (J Econ Theory 68:174–199, 1996; in: Laslier et al. (eds.)
Freedom in economics. New perspectives in normative analysis, 1998) and Puppe and
Xu (Soc Choice Welf, this issue, 2010), an alternative, more general framework is
proposed. Two rankings of freedom’s specific value are axiomatically characterized.
The article concludes with a discussion of possible extensions of the framework.
1 Introduction
Whether we talk about a person’s well-being, try to make quality of life assessments
or evaluate different institutional arrangements in terms of their impact on persons’
lives, our judgements often not only reflect the value of the things a person is actually
doing but will also depend on the value of the things that he or she could have been
doing if she had so chosen. That is, being able to make a choice from among a set
of options—having freedom of choice—has a value that is at least partly indepen-
dent of the actual choice we make or intend to make from that set. For instance, it
makes an important difference whether parents can choose from a number of options
when selecting a school for their children. Similarly, when making a judgment about a
person’s well-being it makes a difference whether that person’s poor health originates
M. van Hees (B)




688 M. van Hees
from a lack of economic means to eat healthily and to exercise regularly, or whether
it was the result of a freely chosen hedonistic but unhealthy lifestyle.
To ascertain how well a person is doing we therefore cannot focus only on what
she is doing; we should also consider what she could be doing. The range of one’s
choice options, i.e., the nature of one’s opportunity set and thus of one’s freedom of
choice, is itself an ingredient of our well-being.1 For this reason, we would like to
be able to make judgements about the value of our freedom: how much value do we
derive from our opportunity set? Is it more valuable to be free to choose from this
particular opportunity set rather than from another one? If so, why?2 Following Ian
Carter, we can make a distinction between two distinct types of reasons for valuing an
opportunity set.3 The first type refers to the value of one’s opportunity set insofar as
that value is independent of the value of the elements of the set. That is, the opportunity
set is taken to have at least some value which cannot be reduced to the value of the
elements of the set. An example of such value, which is called the non-specific value
of freedom, is the value that we may attach to responsibility. If it is of value to be
responsible for one’s choices, and if a person is only responsible for his choices if he
could have chosen differently, then being able to make choices is in itself valuable. To
illustrate, consider the value of a person’s opportunity set which consists of only two
alternatives, x and y. Suppose, as observers, we do not have any information about
the value of x or y; we only know that the options represent two opposite courses of
action and that the person can be held responsible for his eventual choice because he
could have opted for the other alternative. If this responsibility is taken to be valuable,
then being able to choose between x and y has value even though we know nothing
about the value of x and y themselves.4
This article ignores such non-specific value and focuses on freedom’s specific value
only; that is, we want to compare opportunity sets in terms of their value insofar as
that value can be reduced to the value of the elements of the sets.
1.1 Freedom’s specific value and existing freedom rankings
It could be argued that various existing freedom rankings, in particular those that make
use of preference information, already capture freedom’s specific value. Whereas these
approaches do indeed capture an important part of freedom’s specific value, they may
not be able to do so completely.5 Consider first the rather naive idea that an opportunity
1 Of course, I here follow the argumentation put forward by Amartya Sen; see e.g., Sen (1985, 1987, 2004).
2 For a general overview of the ranking of opportunity sets, see Barberà et al. (2004). For an overview of
the literature on freedom rankings, see Dowding and van Hees (2009).
3 Carter (1999). My rendition of the distinction differs, however, from that of Carter and is taken from
Van Hees (2000).
4 Frankfurt (1969) famously criticized the idea that a person can only be held responsible for his actions if
he could have acted differently. The point here, however, is not to defend a particular view of responsibility,
but merely to give an illustration of freedom’s non-specific value if one adheres to a particular theory of
responsibility.
5 In the various preference-based approaches discussed below—indirect utility, effective freedom, expected
indirect utility, reasonable persons’ preferences—the value of an opportunity set is reducible to the value of
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set’s specific value equals its indirect utility—a set A is taken to have at least as much
specific value as a set B if, and only if, there is an alternative in A which is considered
to be at least as good as any element of B. The ranking is naive for two reasons. First,
it fails to take account of the fact that we often attach value to our freedom precisely
because we do not know our preferences. If I am not yet sure about which restaurant I
want to visit tonight, I would rather keep my options open and not make a reservation
yet. The idea that we value freedom because we have such a ‘preference for flexibil-
ity’ (Kreps 1979) can be captured in different ways. The effective freedom ranking
presented by Foster (1992) looks at the various preferences a person could have (his
‘potential preferences’) and then deems a set A to have at least as much value as a set
B if, and only if, for each of the person’s potential preferences the set A has at least as
much indirect utility as the set B. Arrow (1995) captures the same intuition but adds
information about the probability of the various potential preferences. He then ranks
the various opportunity sets in terms of their expected indirect utility.
Whereas the value freedom has because we do not know our future preferences for
sure can thus be taken account of by the more sophisticated indirect utility approaches
of Foster and Arrow, there is a second drawback from which those more sophisticated
versions also suffer. A person’s actual or potential preferences need not track all of the
reasons that we can have for valuing the various alternatives—one may attach value
to some state of affairs even though one has no preference for it. Suppose for instance
that you are not very fond of the works of Franz Kafka. Given the literature that you
do like, you also know for sure that you will never develop a preference for it. Under
any of the indirect utility approaches described above, we should say that adding the
option of reading any of Kafka’s stories or novels does not add to the specific value of
your freedom. However, if we assume that reading Kafka is valuable even for someone
who will never prefer to do so, then the possibility or impossibility of reading Kafka
does affect the value of your freedom. The converse is also possible—a person may
prefer something which he has no reason to value. Take the archetypical sadist who
most prefers a state of the world x in which he inflicts maximum pain on other persons.
On both the indirect utility and the potential preference approaches we should say that
the availability of x adds to the value of the sadist’s opportunity set.
Several proposals have been made to accommodate such divergence between one’s
actual and potential preferences on the one hand and the reasons for valuing some-
thing on the other. The important thing to note is that these proposals also make use
of preference information, albeit not necessarily the preferences of the person whose
freedom we are examining. Instead they are the preferences of the members of some
reference class of individuals. For instance, Pattanaik and Xu (1998) use informa-
tion about the preferences of reasonable persons. Sugden (1998) argues for using the
Footnote 5 continued
its elements in the sense that there is a functional relation between the relevant preference space (or, in case
of Arrow’s ranking, the space of preferences and their possible probabilities) and the freedom ranking. It is
because of the existence of such a functional relation that I say they capture part of freedom’s specific value
rather than non-specific value. Note that this view on the nature of specific value differs from that of Carter
(1999), who takes the value that we attach to freedom because of uncertainty about our future preferences
to be an instance of freedom’s non-specific value.
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preferences of individuals who share certain sociological characteristics with the
person whose freedom we are assessing.
The shift from the indirect utility approaches to approaches that refer to the pref-
erences of ‘reasonable’ or ‘representative’ persons goes a long way toward establish-
ing freedom’s specific value. Indeed, if we take the reasonable persons’ preferences
approach we see that the examples given above can be accommodated: gaining an extra
option which the person in question would never consider choosing (reading Kafka)
does enhance the value of a person’s freedom, whereas the addition of an option that
no reasonable person would ever consider choosing (the sadist’s infliction of pain)
will not do so. However, such agent-independent preferences may also fail to track
the reasons we have for valuing an option if there is a distinction between there being
a reason to value some option x and there being a reasonable (representative) person
who prefers x . Obviously, if such a distinction can indeed be sustained, then the use
of the preferences of reasonable (or representative) persons will not capture all of the
relevant reasons for valuing alternatives.6
1.2 Eligibility
We do not take a stance here with respect to the meta-ethical question of whether the
reasons to value some option can always be tracked by the preferences of reasonable
or representative persons. The issue is circumvented by using a formal framework
that directly takes as input information about the things we have reasons to value; in
this sense our approach is more general than a preference-based one. An additional
reason for using such a more direct approach—though its analysis is not an aim of
this article—is related to that other part of freedom’s value: its non-specific value. As
explained later, we may conjecture that an eligibility approach is able to capture both
freedom’s specific and non-specific value. A preference-based approach, however, will
fail to do justice to freedom’s non-specific value.7
We therefore take as given the existence of an eligibility function which assigns
to each opportunity set a subset of eligible alternatives, that is, alternatives we have
reason to value. The notion of eligibility was introduced in the freedom literature by
Benn and Weinstein (1971), discussed by Day (1977) and later by Jones and Sugden
(1982). In the freedom literature functions that can be interpreted as eligibility func-
tions were introduced by Puppe (1996, 1998) and further explored in Puppe and Xu
(2010), but the functions are formally choice functions; they assign to each set a non-
empty subset.8 The framework here is slightly more general since it allows for the
possibility of the assignment of the empty set.
6 See, for instance, Griffin (2008, pp. 111–113) for an argument for the view that such a distinction should
indeed be made.
7 Carter (1996). See, however, Sen (1996) for a critical discussion of this last claim.
8 Furthermore, an important difference between this article and Puppe (1996, 1998) and Puppe and Xu
(2010) is that in the latter contributions a judgement about an alternative’s eligibility—or essentiality as it
is called there—is derived from a given freedom ranking of opportunity sets. Here the converse route is
followed: we try to derive freedom rankings given judgements about the eligibility of alternatives.
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After having presented the formal framework in Sect. 2, Sect. 3 discusses various
properties of eligibility functions. In Sects. 4 and 5 two ‘eligibility rankings’ are char-
acterized, that is, rankings which are meant to capture the intuitive idea that the value
of a set increases when a person has more reasons to value its elements. One ranking is
a straightforward generalization of the much-discussed cardinality ranking introduced
by Pattanaik and Xu (1990), the other ranking was introduced by Puppe (1996) and
characterized earlier by Puppe and Xu (2010). In the concluding section we discuss
some limitations of these rankings and some possible extensions of the framework.
2 Eligibility functions
Let X be the universal non-empty set of alternatives, assumed to be finite. Z and Z0
denote the set of all non-empty subsets of X and the set of all subsets of X , respectively.
Let  be a binary relation defined over Z , with  and ∼ denoting its asymmetric and
symmetric part, respectively. We shall call  a freedom ranking. There are different
ways in which such a ranking can be interpreted. As explained in the introduction, the
emphasis here is on the analysis of the value of the opportunity set, in particular, its
specific value. A  B is therefore to be interpreted here as ‘the freedom of choice that
A offers has at least as much specific value as that of B’.
An eligibility function is a mapping which specifies for each opportunity set which
of its elements are eligible and which are not:
Definition 2.1 E is a mapping from Z to Z0 such that for all A ∈ Z , E(A) ⊆ A.
Note that an eligibility function can assign the empty set to a set of alternatives. In
other words, a set may fail to contain eligible alternatives. Whether a set may indeed
not have an eligible element in it will depend on the interpretation of the eligibility
notion. Roughly, we can distinguish two lines of interpretation. In the first interpreta-
tion, saying that an element is eligible or not is making a judgement about the goodness
of the state of affairs which results from choosing that element. I may, for instance,
say that the option of smoking cigarettes is ineligible because smoking is bad for my
health. Alternatively, I can take the eligibility of an option to say something about
the admissibility of choosing the option. The option’s eligibility or ineligibility then
describes whether one is allowed to choose it. We may call the first view, the one focus-
ing on the goodness or badness of the states of affairs resulting from one’s choices,
the axiological interpretation of eligibility. The second interpretation, which refers to
the admissibility or inadmissibility of those choices, is a deontic one.
It is reasonable to assume that an eligibility function can assign an empty set on
an axiological interpretation, whereas this is probably not the case on a deontic inter-
pretation. To illustrate with a particularly stark example, suppose an individual is
confronted with a choice between two bads—say she is forced to choose between
a very unhealthy and dangerous job or starvation. If we take the eligibility to refer
only to the goodness of an outcome, then neither of the two options will be eligible.
On the other hand, if we think about eligibility in terms of the admissibility of one’s
choices, then we could argue that at least one of the person’s choice options is eligible.
If not, we would say that any choice an individual makes is inadmissible, violating
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the principle that a person may not be obligated to do the impossible (‘impossibilium
nulla obligatio est’).
Before turning to a discussion of the properties of an eligibility function, we
conclude this section with two useful definitions.
Definition 2.2 Given some E , x ∈ X is unconditionally (or context-independently)
eligible iff for all A ∈ Z , x ∈ A implies x ∈ E(A). x ∈ X is unconditionally (or
context-independently) ineligible iff for all A ∈ Z , x ∈ E(A).
Definition 2.3 For all x, y ∈ X , we say that
1. x is weakly superior to y iff x ∈ E({x, y});
2. x and y are co-ineligible iff for all A containing both x and y, {x, y}∩ E(A) = ∅.
3 Properties of eligibility
An eligibility function ‘almost’ is a choice function; it differs only in that it can assign
the empty set to a set. As is well known from the choice literature, there is a close
relation between consistency properties and the rationalizability of choice functions.
For our purposes, it is helpful to explore the relation between the consistency proper-
ties of an eligibility function and its rationalizability. In this section we shall provide
that analysis, that is, we formulate two rationalizability results for eligibility func-
tions, which form the direct counterparts of two well-known rationalizability results
for choice functions.9
To do so, we must define the relevant notions of consistency and rationalizability
for eligibility functions. First, consider the following consistency requirements for
eligibility functions:
Condition 3.1 (α) For all A ∈ Z and all B ∈ Z , E(A ∪ B) ∩ A ⊆ E(A).
Condition 3.2 (β) For all A, B ∈ Z , if x, y ∈ E(A), then x ∈ E(A ∪ B) iff y ∈
E(A ∪ B).
Condition 3.3 (γ ) For all A, B ∈ Z and all x ∈ X: x ∈ E(A) ∩ E(B) ⇒ x ∈
E(A ∪ B).
Condition 3.4 (ξ ) For all A, B ∈ Z , if E(A) = ∅, then E(A ∪ B) = ∅.
The first three conditions are straightforward adaptations of the corresponding con-
ditions for choice functions (Sen 1971). For instance, α is the extension of Sen’s
Property α; it here expresses that an eligible element remains eligible if one or more
other elements are removed from the opportunity set. Similarly, β and γ are the coun-
terparts of Sen’s Property β and γ for choice functions, respectively. Note that ξ ,
which demands that the expansion of any set having eligible elements has at least
some eligible elements itself, is trivially fulfilled by choice functions.
Next we extend the idea of rationalizability to eligibility functions.
9 In particular, Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 form the counterparts of Theorems T.9 and T.8 of Sen (1971),
respectively.
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Definition 3.1 Given some E , the base relation R is defined as the binary relation
over X satisfying: for any x , y ∈ X , x Ry iff x is weakly superior to or co-ineligible
with y.
Definition 3.2 Let E be an eligibility function and R the corresponding base relation.
We say E is normal iff for all A:
1. E(A) = ∅: E(A) = {x ∈ A | x Ry for all y ∈ A}
2. E(A) = ∅: all x ∈ A are unconditionally ineligible.
Proposition 3.1 An eligibility function E is normal iff E satisfies α, γ , and ξ .
Proof Let R be the base relation.
(a) ⇒: Assume E is normal. Take A ∪ B with non-empty E(A ∪ B)∩ A. If E(A) is
empty, each element of A is unconditionally ineligible, contradicting non-empti-
ness of E(A ∪ B)∩ A. By definition, E(A ∪ B)∩ A = {x ∈ A | x Ry for all y ∈
A ∪ B}. In particular, x ∈ E(A ∪ B) ∩ A implies x Ry for all y ∈ A. Since
E(A) is not empty, x Ry for all y ∈ A implies x ∈ E(A). Hence, α is satisfied.
To prove γ , let x ∈ E(A) ∩ E(B). We then have x Ry for all y ∈ A and x Ry
for all y ∈ B, and thus x Ry for all y ∈ A ∪ B. Since x is not uncondition-
ally ineligible, E(A ∪ B) is non-empty. Hence, from normality it follows that
x ∈ E(A ∪ B). Finally, if E(A ∪ B) = ∅, normality implies that all elements in
A ∪ B are unconditionally ineligible, implying emptiness of E(A). Hence, ξ is
also satisfied.
(b) ⇐: If E(A) = ∅, ξ directly implies that for all x ∈ A, x ∈ E({x}). Hence, by α,
each x ∈ A is unconditionally ineligible. Take A with non-empty E(A). For all
x ∈ E(A) and all y ∈ A, x ∈ E({x, y}) by α. Hence, x Ry for all y which shows
E(A) ⊆ {x ∈ A | x Ry for all y ∈ A}. Now take x ∈ A such that x Ry for all y ∈ A.
We want to show that x ∈ E(A). Take arbitrary y ∈ E(A). By α, y ∈ E({x, y}).
Hence, x and y cannot be co-ineligible, and x Ry entails x ∈ E({x, y}). Note
also that we have E({x}) = {x} by α. Now take arbitrary y ∈ A − E(A). For all
such y, E({x, y}) = ∅ because of E({x}) = {x} and ξ . Hence, x and y are not
co-ineligible, and x Ry therefore entails x ∈ E({x, y}). Since it was already estab-
lished that x ∈ E({x, y}) for all y ∈ E(A), we have x ∈ E({x, y}) for all y ∈ A.
Consequently, by γ , x ∈ E(A) and thus {x ∈ A | x Ry for all y ∈ A} ⊆ E(A). unionsq
Proposition 3.2 An eligibility function E is normal and R is an ordering iff E satisfies
α, β, and ξ .
Proof ⇒: Given Proposition 3.1 it only has to be shown that β is satisfied. Let A be
some set in Z having at least two distinct eligible elements, say x, y ∈ E(A). Assume
x ∈ E(A ∪ B) for some B ∈ Z . By normality x Rz for all z ∈ A ∪ B. Normality also
implies y Rx . Transitivity therefore entails y Rz for all z ∈ E(A ∪ B), which means
that y ∈ E(A ∪ B).
⇐: Since α, β and ξ imply γ , Proposition 3.1 establishes normality. Reflexivity
and completeness follow directly from the definition of R. To show transitivity holds,
assume x Ry and y Rz. We need to examine four possible cases (where P and I denote
the a-symmetric and symmetric parts of R, respectively): (a) x Py and y I z (b) x I y
and y I z, (c) x Py and y Pz, and (d) x I y and y Pz.
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(a) Let x Py and y I z. We then have E({x, y}) = {x}. By ξ E({x, y, z}) = ∅ and by
α, y ∈ E({x, y, z}). If E({y, z}) = ∅, then y I z implies E({y, z}) = {y, z}. Since
y ∈ E({x, y, z}), z ∈ E({x, y, z}) by β which in turn means that E({x, y, z}) =
{x}. If E({y, z}) = ∅, then both y and z are unconditionally ineligible and
non-emptiness of E({x, y, z}) also yields E({x, y, z}) = {x}. Hence, we have
E({x, y, z}) = {x}. Condition α then yields x ∈ E({x, z}) and β z ∈ E({x, z}).
Thus x Pz.
(b) Let x I y and y I z. First, assume either E({x, y}) or E({y, z}) is non-empty. With-
out loss of generality, let E({x, y}) be non-empty. By normality E({x, y}) =
{x, y}. By ξ E({x, y, z}) = ∅. Since y ∈ E({x, y}), α and ξ imply E({y, z}) = ∅.
This means that y and z or not co-ineligible, and y I z thus entails E({y, z}) =
{y, z}. E({x, y, z}) = ∅ and β now imply E({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z} which by
α entails E({x, z}) = {x, z}, which had to be shown. Next let E({x, y}) =
E({y, z}) = ∅. Conditions α and ξ together imply E({x, z}) = ∅ and thus x I z.
(c) If x Py and y Pz, then {x} = E({x, y}) and {y} = E({y, z}). E({x, y, z}) = ∅
because of ξ , and by αy ∈ E({x, y, z}) and z ∈ E({x, y, z}). Hence, x ∈
E({x, y, z}) and x ∈ E({x, z}) by α. Since z ∈ E({x, z}) because of β, we have
x Pz.
(d) If x I y and y Pz, E({y, z}) = {y} and E({x, y}) = {x, y} or ∅. If E({x, y}) = ∅,
we must by α have E({x, y, z}) = ∅, contradicting ξ . Hence, E({x, y}) = {x, y}.
By α, z /∈ E({x, y, z}) and by β, x ∈ E({x, y, z}). Hence, and again by α and
β, E({x, z} = {x} and x Pz. unionsq
4 The simple eligibility ranking
Perhaps the simplest way to compare opportunity sets is to say that the assessment
of an opportunity set only depends on the number of eligible elements which that
particular set contains. We call such rankings internal. Whether an alternative which
is eligible in A is also eligible in A ∪ B, for instance, is not relevant when using an
internal ranking for comparing A and B. Clearly, different internal eligibility rankings
are possible. That is, we can formulate different ways of basing the assessment of a set
on the number of eligible elements within that set. We here characterize one internal
ranking, viz. the one according to which the more eligible elements a set has, the more
valuable it is.10
Definition 4.1 (Simple eligibility ranking) For all A, B ∈ Z , A # B ⇔ #E(A) ≥
#E(B).
Clearly, if any element of any opportunity set is taken to be eligible, the ranking
coincides with the simple cardinality ranking presented by Pattanaik and Xu (1990).
That is, the more elements an opportunity set has, the higher it is ranked. Dissatisfied
with the simple cardinality ranking, Pattanaik and Xu (1998) later presented a ranking
10 An alternative internal ranking, for instance, could be based on the ratio between the number of eligible
elements and the total number of elements in the set. Cf. Steiner (1994) for a defence and Van Hees (1998)
for a characterization of such a ratio-ranking in a slightly different context.
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which makes use of the preferences of reasonable persons. The ranking compares two
sets A and B on the basis of the cardinality of their respective ‘maximal sets’ (i.e., the
sets consisting of elements that are considered to be best elements within that set by at
least one of the reasonable persons). In our framework, that ranking can also be seen
as an instance of the simple eligibility ranking. To do so, we only have to stipulate that
an element x of an opportunity set A is eligible, if, and only if, x is a best element of
A according to at least one reference ordering.
Of the four axioms that we use, three can be seen as weakenings of corresponding
axioms of Pattanaik and Xu (1990) since they here pertain only to the eligible elements
of a set. For instance, Pattanaik and Xu’s first axiom states that any two singleton sets
are to be ranked equally. In our rendition of it, we demand that singleton sets with
eligible elements are to be ranked equally:
Axiom 4.1 (Indifference Between Singletons (IBS)) For all distinct x, y ∈ X , if x ∈
E({x}) and y ∈ E({y}), then {x} ∼ {y}.
Our next axiom is a monotonicity requirement. It states that adding an element x to a
set A will lead to an enlargement of the set’s quality if the new element x is eligible
and if all alternatives that were eligible in A remains so in A ∪ {x}.
Axiom 4.2 (Monotonicity (M)) For all A ∈ Z and for all x ∈ X − A, if E(A ∪{x}) =
E(A) ∪ {x}, then A ∪ {x}  A.
Obviously, this monotonicity requirement is much weaker than the assumption that
any enlargement of a set will lead to a strict increase of its value. In fact, the next
axiom—Weak Irrelevant Expansion—explicitly states that certain enlargements of a
set do not enlarge the set’s value.
Axiom 4.3 (Weak Irrelevant Expansion (WIE)) For all A ∈ Z and for all x ∈ X − A,
if E(A ∪ {x}) = E(A), then A ∪ {x} ∼ A.
Our final axiom is an independence axiom. It states that adding an alternative x to a
set A and y to a set B will not affect the ranking of A and B vis-à-vis each other if
all the elements of A and B as well as all the elements of A ∪ {x} and B ∪ {y} are
eligible.11
Axiom 4.4 (Restricted Composition (RC)) For all A, B ∈ Z such that E(A) = A and
E(B) = B and for all x ∈ X − A and for all y ∈ X − B such that E(A∪{x}) = A∪{x}
and E(B ∪ {y}) = B ∪ {y}:
A  B iff A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {y}.
Proposition 4.1 Let E be normal. A reflexive and transitive relation  satisfies IBS,
M, WIE, and RC iff =#.
11 The axiom is a weakening of the composition axiom used by Sen (1991). Strictly speaking, it is not a
weaker version of the independence axiom used by Pattanaik and Xu since, to derive completeness of the
resulting ranking, the added alternatives x and y may here be distinct whereas they should be the same in
Pattanaik and Xu.
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We will not give a complete proof of the proposition but instead only prove the fol-
lowing lemma which forms the crucial new element of the complete proof.
Lemma 4.1 Let E be normal and let  be a reflexive and transitive relation satisfying
WIE. For all A ∈ Z:
1. E(A) = ∅: A ∼ {x} for all x ∈ A;
2. E(A) = ∅: A ∼ E(A).
Proof
(1) E(A) = ∅. By ξ and α, A has no subsets with eligible elements. Hence, for all
x ∈ A, E({x}) = ∅. Take some x ∈ A and add one by one all elements of A−{x}
to {x}. We then obtain A ∼ {x} by WIE and transitivity.
(2) E(A) = ∅. If A = E(A) the result follows from reflexivity. Let therefore A =
E(A). We first show that for any B, E(A) ⊆ B ⊂ A, there is an x ∈ A − B such
that E(B) = E(B ∪ {x}).
(2a) Assume E(A − B) = ∅ and let x be an arbitrary element of A − B. Since
A − B contains no eligible elements, x is unconditionally ineligible. In
particular, we have x ∈ E(B ∪ {x}). Hence, E(B ∪ {x}) ⊆ E(B). Take
y ∈ E(B). Since x is unconditionally ineligible, y Px . Since we also have
y Rz for all z ∈ B by normality, y Rz for all z ∈ B ∪ {x}. It follows that
y ∈ E(B ∪ {x}) and thus that E(B) ⊆ E(B ∪ {x}).
(2b) Assume E(A − B) = ∅. Take x ∈ E(A − B). By normality we have x Ry
for all y ∈ A−B. If x Ry also holds for all y ∈ B, we would have x ∈ E(A)
by normality and non-emptiness of E(A), contradicting x ∈ A − B and
E(A) ⊆ B. Hence, y Px for some y ∈ B and thus x ∈ E(B ∪ {x}),
which means that E(B ∪ {x}) ⊆ E(B). If x Pz for some z ∈ E(B), we
have y Pz by transitivity, contradicting z ∈ E(B). Hence, for all z ∈ E(B)
and all y ∈ B∪{x}, z Ry. Thus z ∈ E(B∪{x}), that is, E(B) ⊆ E(B∪{x}).
Hence, for any B such that E(A) ⊆ B ⊂ A there is an x ∈ A − B for which
E(B∪{x}) = E(B). This means we can label the elements of A−E(A) as x1, x2, . . . ,
such that E(E(A)) = E(E(A) ∪ {x1}) = E(E(A) ∪ {x1, x2}) = . . . = E(A). If we
subsequently add the elements x1, x2, . . . one by one to E(A) we arrive at the desired
result by WIE and transitivity of . unionsq
Proposition 4.1 can now be derived with the help of the original result of Pattanaik
and Xu (1990). That is, their result entails that E(A)  E(B) iff #E(A) ≥ #E(B) for
all A, B (E(A) = ∅ = E(B)). The proposition follows from the lemma plus the fact
that A  B whenever E(A) = ∅ = E(B).
5 The relative eligibility ranking
Assume there is some element in X , say x , which represents a pure state of ‘bliss’.
Any view about what constitutes the good life would judge it to be the uniquely best of
all possible worlds. Clearly the availability of such an alternative means one’s choice
set is much more valuable than a choice set in which the various options are merely
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satisfactory. Yet, as long as those latter options are also deemed to be eligible, such a
conclusion is not ensured on the simple eligibility ranking. After all, it judges any two
choice sets having the same number of eligible alternatives to be of equal value. For
instance, if x is the blissful option and y one of average quality, we have {x} ∼# {y}.
We can avoid such a conclusion by considering a ranking which ranks two opportu-
nity sets A and B not only on the basis of information about the eligibility of alternatives
within A and B, but also takes account of the eligibility of an alternative in the set
A ∪ B. To understand the rationale of this, consider an interpretation of eligibility in
terms of the person’s actual preferences: an element of A is eligible if it is one of the
individual’s most preferred elements in A. The value of an available option x—x’s
eligibility—is determined completely by whether the element is ‘the best the agent
can do’; if the agent has the option of choosing a more preferred alternative, then x
is not eligible. On such a view about the eligibility of options, it is natural to say that
a ranking of A versus B should depend on the eligibility of the elements of A in the
context of those of B, and vice versa. Suppose for instance that a set A has two best
elements and that B has only one, but that the person strictly prefers the best element of
B to those of A. If only utility considerations matter, we would like to have a ranking
that judges B to confer more value than A.
The ranking which is analyzed next, and which we call the relative eligibility rank-
ing, expresses this idea. It was first introduced by Puppe (1996) and characterized
in Puppe and Xu (2010). It avoids the problem of the simple ranking by making a
comparison between two sets A and B dependent on the eligible alternatives within
the set A ∪ B.
Definition 5.1 (Relative eligibility ranking) For all A, B ∈ Z , A + B ⇔ #(E(A ∪
B) ∩ A) ≥ #(E(A ∪ B) ∩ B).
Our characterization of this ranking differs in several respects from Puppe’s and Xu’s.
First of all, we should allow for the possibility that an opportunity set does have not
any eligible elements whereas this is precluded in Puppe’s and Xu’s framework. Sec-
ond, an important difference concerns the assumptions that are being made. We here
examine the conditions under which a reflexive and transitive relation over Z coincides
with the relative eligibility ranking. Puppe’s and Xu’s main result, on the other hand,
states the conditions under which any binary relation coincides with it. Clearly, the
restriction to the class of transitive and reflexive binary relations limits the generality
of our results but it has the advantage of allowing us to use weaker conditions in the
derivation of our result. In fact, it enables us to clearly see the difference between the
characterization of the relative ranking and that of the simple ranking.
Indeed, we obtain our next result by dropping the axiom IBS and by strengthening
two of the other axioms used to characterize #. In particular, we strengthen WIE and
M:
Axiom 5.1 (Irrelevant Expansion (IE)) For all A ∈ Z and for all x ∈ X − A, if
x ∈ E(A ∪ {x}), then A ∪ {x} ∼ A.
Axiom 5.2 (Strong Monotonicity (SM)) For all A ∈ Z and for all x ∈ X − A, if
x ∈ E(A ∪ {x}), then A ∪ {x}  A.
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Before we proceed we note that these strengthenings are difficult to combine with IBS.
According to IE and SM, the effect of an expansion of a set is only dependent on the
eligibility of the added element. Because of path-dependencies, the conditions will in
combination with IBS lead to a violation of transitivity if there is context-dependent
eligibility:
Proposition 5.1 Let E be normal. A reflexive and transitive relation  satisfies IBS,
IE, and SM only if each element in X is either unconditionally eligible or uncondi-
tionally ineligible.
Proof It is easily verified that if some x ∈ X is not unconditionally eligible or ineli-
gible, we have some C ∈ Z such that x ∈ E(C) and x ∈ E(X). By normality of E
there is some y ∈ E(X) − C such that E({x, y}) = {y}. By α and x ∈ E(C) we have
E({x}) = {x}. Similarly, E({x, y}) = {y} entails E({y}) = {y}. Hence, {x} ∼ {y} by
IBS. However, E({x, y}) = {y} implies {x, y}  {x} by SM, and {x, y} ∼ {y} by IE,
violating transitivity. unionsq
We next present two lemmas, the first of which is a straightforward application of RC:
Lemma 5.1 If a reflexive relation  satisfies RC, then x ∈ E({x}), y ∈ E({y}), and
{x, y} = E({x, y}) implies {x} ∼ {y}.
Lemma 5.2 Let E be normal and R its base relation. If a transitive relation  satisfies
IE, SM, and RC, then R is an ordering.
Proof Completeness and reflexivity of R follows directly from α and the definition
of R. To prove transitivity, assume for some x, y, z ∈ X , we have x Ry and y Rz. We
prove by contradiction: let z Px , that is, E({x, z}) = {z}. We need to consider the
following cases:
(a) E({x, y}) = {x, y}. Property α implies non-empty E({y}) and thus by ξ non-
empty E({y, z}). Given y Rz, either (a1) E({y, z}) = {y, z} or (a2) E({y, z}) =
{y}. Assume (a1). By γ and α, E({x, y, z}) = {y, z}. IE implies {x, y, z} ∼ {y, z}
and SM {x, y, z}  {x, y}. By Lemma 5.1 {x} ∼ {y} and by RC {x, y} ∼ {y, z},
violating transitivity of . Consider next (a2). By α and x ∈ E({x, z}), x ∈
E({x, y, z}). Similarly, α and z ∈ E({y, z}), entails z ∈ E({x, y, z}). Since
E({x, y, z}) = ∅ by ξ , we have E({x, y, z}) = {y}. IE entails {x, y, z} ∼
{y, z} ∼ {y}, and {x, y, z} ∼ {x, y}. By SM {x, y}  {y}, violating transitivity
of .
(b) E({x, y}) = {x}. By α, x, y ∈ E({x, y, z}). By ξ we have non-emptiness of
E({x, y, z}), and thus E({x, y, z}) = {z}. It follows from α that z ∈ E({y, z}).
Hence, E({y, z}) = {y, z} because of y Rz. With IE we derive {x, y, z} ∼
{x, z} ∼ {z} and {x, y, z} ∼ {y, z}. By SM {y, z}  {z} violating transitivity
of .
(c) E({x, y}) = ∅. We then have E({x, y, z}) = {z} by ξ and α. By α, E({y, z}) =
{z}, contradicting y Rz. unionsq
Proposition 5.2 Let E be normal. A reflexive and transitive relation  satisfies IE,
SM, and RC iff =+.
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Proof
(a) ⇐: The proofs of SM and of the necessity part of RC are straightforward and
therefore omitted. To prove that + satisfies IE and the sufficiency part of RC,
it is useful to note that for all x, y ∈ X , {x} + {y} iff x Ry, where R is the base
relation. Transitivity of + thus entails transitivity of R, which in turn means
that β is satisfied (Proposition 3.2).
IE: Take A ∈ Z and x ∈ X − A for which x ∈ E(A∪{x}). If E(A∪{x}) = ∅, we
see directly that A ∪ {x} ∼+ A. Let E(A ∪ {x}) = ∅. Since x ∈ E(A ∪ {x}), we
have E(A ∪ {x}) ∩ A = ∅. By β, we then have E(A ∪ {x}) ∩ A = E(A)
and, because x ∈ E(A ∪ {x}), E(A ∪ {x}) ∩ (A ∪ {x}) = E(A). Hence,
A ∪ {x} ∼+ A.
RC: Let A, B be opportunity sets such that for some x ∈ X − A and y ∈ X −B we
have E(A∪{x}) = A∪{x} and E(B∪{y}) = B∪{y}. Assume A + B. It has to
be shown that A∪{x} + B∪{y}. If E(A∪B∪{x, y})∩(B∪{y}) = ∅, the result
follows immediately. Therefore, let E(A ∪ B ∪{x, y})∩ (B ∪{y}) = ∅. Because
E(B ∪{y}) = B ∪{y}, we have, by β, E(A ∪ B ∪{x, y})∩ (B ∪{y}) = B ∪{y}.
By α and β, we have E(A ∪ B) ∩ B = E(B) = B. Since A + B,
E(A∪ B)∩ A = ∅. In particular, we then have by β, E(A∪ B)∩ A = E(A) = A.
Non-emptiness of E(A∪ B∪{x, y})∩(A∪ B) implies by α and β non-emptiness
of E(A ∪ B ∪ {x, y}) ∩ A and thus also of E(A ∪ B ∪ {x, y}) ∩ (A ∪ {x}). By α
and β, E(A ∪ B ∪{x, y})∩ (A ∪{x}) = E(A ∪{x}) = A ∪{x}. A + B implies
#(E(A ∪ B) ∩ A) = #E(A) = # A ≥ #(E(A ∪ B) ∩ B) = #E(B) = #B. But
then also #[E(A ∪ B ∪ {x, y}) ∩ (A ∪ {x})] = #E(A ∪ {x}) = #(A ∪ {x}) ≥
#[E(A ∪ B ∪ {x, y}) ∩ (B ∪ {y})] = #E(B ∪ {y}) = #(B ∪ {y}).
(b) ⇒: Let A and B be two sets with #E(A ∪ B) ∩ A ≥ #E(A ∪ B) ∩ B.
Case 1 #E(A ∪ B) ∩ A = #E(A ∪ B) ∩ B = 0.
By α, E(A∪ B) = ∅. We thus have to show that A ∼ B. By ξ and Lemma 4.1 we
can take some x ∈ A and y ∈ B such that E({x}) = ∅ = E({y}) and A ∼ {x}
and B ∼ {y}. From E({x}) = ∅ = E({y}) we have, by α, E({x, y}) = ∅. Hence,
again by Lemma 4.1, {x} ∼ {x, y} ∼ {y}. A ∼ B now follows from transitivity.
Case 2 E(A) = ∅ = E(B).
By α, E(A ∪ B)∩ B = ∅. Since therefore E(A ∪ B)∩ A = ∅, it has to be shown
that A  B.
As E(B) = ∅, we have by Lemma 4.1 and ξ for all x ∈ B E({x}) = ∅ and
B ∼ {x}. Take y ∈ E(A∪ B)∩ A. By α, y ∈ E(A) and y ∈ E({x, y}). By α also
x ∈ E({x, y}) and y ∈ E({y}), and by SM thus {x, y}  {x} and {x, y} ∼ {y}.
Hence, by transitivity {y}  B. Now add one by one the other elements of E(A)
to {y}. By α each such added element is eligible in the new set, and thus by
repeated application of SM and transitivity E(A)  {y}. Lemma 4.1 shows that
A ∼ E(A). Applying transitivity one more time we get A  B.
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Case 3 E(A∪B)∩B = ∅. By α we then have E(B) = ∅. Since #E(A∪B)∩ A ≥
#E(A ∪ B) ∩ B, we then also have E(A ∪ B) ∩ A = ∅ = E(A). By Lemma 5.2
the base relation R is an ordering and β is therefore satisfied.
By β, E(A) = E(A ∪ B) ∩ A and E(B) = E(A ∪ B) ∩ B. Given Lemma
4.1, it therefore suffices to show that E(A) ∼ E(B) if #E(A) = #E(B) and
E(A)  E(B) if #E(A) > #E(B). Take x ∈ E(A) and y ∈ E(B). Since x, y ∈
E(A ∪ B) we have, by α, E({x, y}) = {x, y}, E({x}) = {x} and E({y}) = {y}.
Hence, {x} ∼ {y} by Lemma 5.1. Adding #B − 1 elements of E(A) one by one
to {x} and the remaining elements of B − {y} one by one to y, yields by RC
C ∼ B, where C is the subset resulting from adding the #B − 1 elements of
E(A) to {x}. If C = E(A), we have the first desired result. If C = E(A), adding
the remaining elements of E(A) to C yields by SM and transitivity, E(A)  C .
Hence, by transitivity also E(A)  E(B). unionsq
The assumption of transitivity of  had a significant impact on the results. Puppe
and Xu show (2010, Proposition 4.5) that if an eligibility function E assigns a non-
empty subset to any opportunity set, then the relation + is transitive if, and only
if, E satisfies α and β. Clearly, condition β is then rather demanding since it entails
that an eligibility function can always be rationalized by a unique preference ordering.
Indeed, if we drop the assumption of transitivity we find rankings which satisfy the
axioms but which do not coincide with # or +:
Example X = {x, y}, E({x, y}) = {x}, E({x}) = {x}, and E({y}) = ∅. Assume
{x, y}  {y}, {x, y} ∼ {x}, and {x} ∼ {y}. E satisfies α, β, γ , and ξ and  satisfies
all of the axioms used so far. However, # ==+.
We conclude this section by noting that the simple and relative eligibility ranking
will coincide in very special cases only. Indeed, it follows from Proposition 5.1 that
they do so only if each element of X is unconditionally eligible or unconditionally
ineligible.
6 Conclusion
We have explored various ways of capturing the specific value of opportunity sets,
that is, the value that we assign to the freedom to be able to pick an element from a
set insofar as that value can be reduced to the value of the elements of the set. The
framework makes use of eligibility functions, which were introduced in the formal
literature by Puppe (1996, 1998).
The simple and relative eligibility ranking have an important feature in common.
Both are cardinal measures; they are based on a count of the number of eligible
elements in a set. An element’s eligibility was taken as indicative of the fact that a
person has reason to value that alternative. As is well known, a cardinal approach may
yield counterintuitive conclusions since it does not take account of the similarities or
dissimilarities within a set (Pattanaik and Xu 1990; Van Hees 2004). Suppose x is
an option which is eligible, i.e., an alternative a person has reason to value. Say x
is a can of orange juice and enlarge the person’s opportunity set with another can of
juice, y, which only differs from x in its bar code. Clearly, the person will value y for
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exactly the same reasons as he values x—the fact that the juice comes in a can with
a different bar code does not provide a new reason to value it. The specific value of
the opportunity set has not increased even though the set has been enlarged with an
eligible element. However, this means that both the simple and the relative eligibility
ranking may overstate a set’s specific value. After all, the addition does lead to a strict
increase of the opportunity set’s value in both rankings.
We do not want to discuss here possible solutions to the problem of finding a mea-
sure of freedom that is sensitive to the degree of diversity within a set.12 However,
we do think that the need to incorporate diversity considerations naturally suggests a
multi-dimensional extension of the framework. To see why, note that we may deem
diversity to be important because, first, we may not yet know the reason why we value
the alternatives; we may call this the epistemic consideration. That is, even though
we should now assign a value to an opportunity set, the eligibility of its elements can
only be assessed at some later point in time. An illustration of this perspective is the
preference-for-flexibility approach discussed in the introduction. If we say that the
eligibility of an alternative is determined by whether it realizes our future preferences,
then in the absence of information about the exact nature of those future preferences we
can at best assume the existence of multiple eligibility functions, representing judge-
ments we can potentially make. Second, we may value a set’s diversity because it
points out that eligibility can have a multi-dimensional nature. Consider, for instance,
Nussbaum’s capability theory according to which a person is able to live a life of dig-
nity if he is able to choose particular functionings (Nussbaum 2006). If the alternatives
are taken to be vectors of functionings, we can formulate for each relevant functioning
an eligibility function which describes which elements of a set realize that particular
functioning. In that case there are as many eligibility functions as there are different
functionings, or more generally, as there are different reasons for valuing an outcome.
As in the epistemic case, we then assume the existence of a family of normal eligibil-
ity functions and can formulate extensions of our rankings to this multi-dimensional
setting. In the epistemic case, the extensions of the eligibility rankings would be based
on the maximal number of eligibility considerations (different future preferences) that
the set can accommodate for. In the interpretation in which eligibility itself is multi-
dimensional, they will be based on the maximal number of eligibility considerations
(e.g., functionings one has reason to value) that specific elements of the set satisfy.
A second important issue is whether the eligibility framework can be used to cap-
ture freedom’s non-specific value. It is particularly interesting to explore the question
whether this part of freedom’s value requires the abandonment of the assumption of
normality of eligibility functions.13 Sen’s celebrated examples pointing out the pos-
sible non-normality of choice functions may be helpful here. Take, for instance, an
alternative which in itself is ineligible (say starvation) but which becomes eligible if a
person has the option of choosing the opposite state of affairs (i.e., it becomes fasting
rather than starvation). The example could be used to point out that our freedom has
12 For important contributions, see Pattanaik and Xu (2000), Nehring and Puppe (2002), Bossert et al.
(2003), and Bervoets and Gravel (2007).
13 For a discussion of dropping the assumption of normality of eligibility functions in the context of the
ranking of capability sets, see Binder (2009).
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a value which originates from the act of choosing itself, rather than from the contents
of our choices. Similarly, and returning to the argument discussed in the introduction,
we may value having the option to choose a non-valuable alternative because the
alternative’s availability creates responsibility. If such a responsibility-generating
effect can only occur if there are other choice options, the element x would be eli-
gible in a set A which contains other elements as well but not in the singleton set
{x}. Clearly, we then have a violation of normality. Furthermore, as is well known
from the literature on choice functions, since non-normal eligibility functions cannot
be rationalized by orderings, we have a further argument for using the more general
framework of eligibility functions rather than a preference-based approach.
A further interesting question to explore is whether the ‘eligibility approach’ allows
us to derive judgements about the measurement of the value of our freedom in a social
context. Except for Gravel et al. (1998) and, more recently, Bervoets (2007), no formal
work has been done on this issue. An obvious possibility is to say that we then want
to rank games rather than opportunity sets, and to associate with each game the set of
its equilibria as the set of its eligible outcomes.
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